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1A canonical procedure is described, which associates to each
inﬁnite information collecting situation a related information col-
lecting situation with ﬁnite state and action spaces, in such a
way that the two corresponding IC-games are near to each other.
Compensations for informants are then also near to each other in
the two IC-situations, if they are based on continuous compensa-
tion rules.
Keywords: Bi-monotonic allocation scheme; Cooperative game;
Core; Discretization; Information collecting situation
1 Introduction
In this paper information collecting (IC) situations and games (cf. Brânzei
et al., 2001 (a,b); Tijs et al., 2001) are central. They model decision-making
situations where the outcome of any decision depends on the state of the
nature and the decision-maker is imperfectly informed. Collecting informa-
t i o nf r o ma v a i l a b l ea g e n t sw h oa r em o r ei n f o r m e da b o u tt h es i t u a t i o nc r e a t e s
the potential for better decisions. More reﬁned information to support the
decision-making process yields, in principle, additional reward which is the
source to compensate the informants.
Diﬀerent procedures for collecting information have given rise to natural
compensation rules in the context of cooperative game theory. Relevant for
the class of information collecting games are marginal based compensation
rules and bi-monotonic allocation schemes.
The state space and the action space in an information collecting sit-
uation can be inﬁnite. We consider possibilities of approximating such an
IC-situation with a ﬁnite IC-situation where the state space and the action
2space are ﬁnite and we relate the original IC-game with the IC-games of ﬁ-
nite approximations. The considered approximations turn out to be good in
the sense that the corresponding games are nearby. So continuity properties
of relevant solutions for the class of IC-games are interesting. We compare
relevant solutions such as the core (Gillies, 1953), the set of bi-monotonic al-
location schemes (Brânzei et al., 2001b) and marginal-based allocation rules
(Tijs et al., 2001) of the approximate game with those of the original game,
extending results from Lucchetti et al. (1987).
T h eo u t l i n eo ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s . I nS e c t i o n2w ei n t r o d u c eI C -
situations and the corresponding games, look at properties and also at the
subclass of IC-games, where a certain concavity condition holds. Section 3
deals with compensation rules and continuity properties of solution concepts
which are relevant for the class of IC-games. In Sections 4 and 5 we present
procedures for discretizing the state space (going from an inﬁnite state space
to a ﬁnite one) and for reducing the dimension of the action space, respec-
tively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Information collecting situations and games
Information collecting situations model cooperative behavior of agents when
one of them (the decision-maker) is facing uncertainty due to informational
deﬁciencies when making decisions and the others (the informants) can pro-
vide additional information about the state of the nature.
In an information collecting (IC) situation the decision-maker has to de-
cide which action to take in order to maximize his expected reward which
depends upon both his choice and the true state of the world not precisely
3known by the agent. An IC situation C is described by the tuple
C =
D
N,n,(Ω,F,µ),{Ii}i∈N ,A,r: Ω × A → <
E
where agent n ∈ N is the decision-maker (action taker) who has to choose
an action a from inﬁnite action set A and can consult the several informants
in N \{n}. (Ω,F,µ) is a measure space, where Ω is the set of possible states
which are relevant to the decision situation, F is a σ-algebra of subsets of
Ω and µ is a probability measure, which describes the prior belief of the
decision maker over all the states ω in Ω. The information of each (partially)
informed agent in N about the state ω ∈ Ω at hand is represented by the
information partition Ii,aﬁnite partition of Ω into F-measurable sets Ii(ω)
with positive measure. If ω ∈ Ω i st h et r u es t a t e ,t h e na g e n ti knows that
the event Ii(ω) happens, where Ii(ω) is that element (atom) of the partition
Ii of Ω that contains ω. Decision-maker n receives the reward r(ω,a) if ω
turns out to be the true state and he chooses action a. We assume that
the reward function is a bounded F-measurable function and that agent n is
risk-neutral.
Related to an IC-situation with decision-maker n,w ed e ﬁne a cooperative
game, the IC-game. The IC-game (N,v) is deﬁned by the player set N =
{1,2,...,n} and the characteristic function v :2 N → <, with domain the









for all S ∈ 2N with n ∈ S.H e r eIS = ∧i∈SIi i st h ec o a r s e s tp a r t i t i o no fΩ




















Example 1 Let C =
D
N,n,(Ω,F,µ),{Ii}i∈N ,A,r: Ω × A → <
E
be the in-
formation collecting situation with N = {1,2,3}, n =3 ; Ω =[ 0 ,1], F





















, I3 = {[0,1]}; A =[ 0 ,1];







































































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯dx =5 5=v({2,3}),


































A characterization of IC-games is given in Brânzei et al. (2001 (a,b))
w h e r ei ti ss h o w nt h a tag a m ei sa nI C - g a m ew i t hd e c i s i o n - m a k e rn if and
only if it is a n-monotonic game in which the decision-maker has veto power,
that is v(S) ≤ v(T),f o ra l ln ∈ S ⊂ T ⊂ N,a n dv(S)=0for each S ⊂ N
with n/ ∈ S.W ed e n o t eb yMVn the set of such games.
5For each coalition S ⊂ N and i ∈ S, the marginal contribution of player
i in the game hN,vi is deﬁned by
Mi(S,v)=v(S) − v(S \{ i}).
A game hN,vi in MVn is a so-called big-boss game if it satisﬁes




for all S ⊂ N with n ∈ S.
Interesting are those IC-games with the n-concavity property. An IC-
game (N,v) is called n-concave if
Mi(S,v)=v(S) − v(S \{ i}) ≥ v(T) − v(T \{ i})=Mi(T,v)
for all i ∈ N \{ n},a n df o ra l lS ⊂ T ⊂ N with {i,n} ⊂ S.
We denote this subclass of IC-games by MVnCn.I ti ss h o w ni nB r â n z e ie t
al. (2001b)t h a tan o n - n e g a t i v eI C - g a m ew i t hd e c i s i o nm a k e rn is n-concave
if and only if it is a total big-boss game (cf. Muto et al., 1988).
A game hN,vi in MVn is called a total big-boss game if it satisﬁes




for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N with n ∈ S.
3 Compensation rules and continuity
considerations
If the decision-maker n works together with the agents in N \{ n} to im-
prove his reward, then the question ’How to compensate the informants?’
6arises. The introduced IC-game opens the possibility to consider compensa-
tion schemes which correspond to solution concepts for cooperative games.
In particular, we focus on marginal based allocation rules, where the com-
pensation of each informant is based on the marginal contribution induced
by his information to the decision-maker’s reward and on bi-monotonic al-
location schemes which take the decision-maker’s veto power into account.
Both of these compensation solutions are related with the core of an IC-game,
which is always non-empty.













The continuity properties of the core for cooperative games are discussed
in Lucchetti et al. (1987). In that paper and also here the linear space of
n-person games is endowed with a metric d deﬁned by
d(v,w)=kv − wk∞ =m a x
S∈2N |v(S) − w(S)|.
In order to study continuity properties of relevant solution concepts for
IC-games, we give some deﬁnitions and introduce some useful notations.
Denote by Pn the set {S ⊂ N | n ∈ S} of coalitions containing the decision-
maker n.
An allocation scheme [bS,i]S∈Pn,i∈S is a bi-mas of v if
(bS,i)i∈S ∈ C(S,v), bS,n ≤ bT,n and bS,i ≥ bT,i
for all S,T ∈ Pn with S ⊂ T and all i ∈ S \{ n}.H e r eC(S,v) denotes the
core of the subgame (S,v).
Example 2 Take the information collecting situation of Example 1. Note
7that v ∈ MV3 and that also v is 3-convex. The allocation scheme
123
{3} −−51
{1,3} 2 − 53
{2,3} − 25 3
N 115 5
is a bi-monotonic allocation scheme corresponding to the τ-value (cf. Tijs,
1981), where each of the informants 1 and 2 obtains half of his marginal
contribution in the subgames to which he belongs.
An imputation x is bi-mas extendable if there is a bi-mas [bS,i]S∈Pn,i∈S,
such that xj = bN,j for all j ∈ N.
We denote by BMN
n the set of all games (N,v) w h i c hh a v ea tl e a s to n e









× N | n,i ∈ S
o
.





BIMAS is the non-empty-valued multifunction which assigns to each v ∈
BMN
n the set of all bi-monotonic allocation schemes [bS,i]S∈Pn,i∈S of v,w h e r e
for each S ∈ Pn the ’row’ (bS,i)i∈S is a core element of the subgame (S,v) with
extra conditions of the form bS,i ≥ bT,i for each i ∈ N \{ n} and bS,n ≤ bT,n,
which are linear inequalities.
By the related stability theorems in this ﬁeld (Walkup and Wets, 1969;
Lucchetti et al., 1987) we obtain
8Theorem 1 The multifunction BIMAS is upper and lower semicontinuous.
I ti ss h o w ni nB r â n z e ie ta l . ( 2 0 0 1 b) that any core element of a game
v ∈ MVnCn is extendable to a bi-mas. In total big-boss games the use of
the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler, 1969) as an allocation mechanism generates
a bi-mas (see Voorneveld et al., 2000) and the nucleolus coincides here with
the τ-value (cf. Tijs, 1981).
Now we concentrate on marginal based allocation rules, where the reward
compensation of each informant is a fraction of his marginal contribution.
In a marginal based allocation rule informant i receives αiMi(N,v) with





For every ﬁxed α =( α1,α2,...,αn−1) ∈ [0,1]
N\{n},w ed e ﬁne the marginal
allocation rule
Ψ











Theorem 2 For every ﬁxed α, the function Ψα is (2n − 1)-Lipschitz.
Proof. Let v and w belong to MVnCn :
αi |Mi(N,v) − Mi(N,w)| ≤ αi |v(N) − w(N)|+αi |v(N \{ i}) − w(N \{ i})| ≤
2kv − wk∞
for every i ∈ N \{ n} and












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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α(w)k∞ ≤ (2n − 1)kv − wk∞ .
It is shown (Tijs et al., 2001) that any core element of a game v ∈ MVn is
a marginal based allocation rule and that the set of marginal based allocation
rules for a game v in MVn coincides with the core of the game if and only if
v is a big-boss game.
4 The canonical discretization of an IC-situation
In this section we describe a natural way to discretize the inﬁnite state space
Ω of an IC-situation
C =
D
N,n,(Ω,F,µ),{Ii}i∈N ,A,r: Ω × A → <
E










0 × A → <
E
w h e r et h es t a t es p a c eΩ0 is ﬁnite. The idea behind the discretization is
simple. Each of the players in the IC-situation C is provided with a ﬁnite
information partition Ii of Ω.T h ec o m m o nr e ﬁnement IN = ∧i∈NIi is also a
ﬁnite partition of Ω.E a c ha t o mo ft h i sc o m m o nr e ﬁnement consists of points
which are neither distinguishable by agents nor by coalitions who pool their
information. So it is natural to replace such an atom by one point and then
these points generate Ω0. The probability measure, the information parti-
tions and the reward function can then be adjusted, leading to the canonical
discretization.
10In the following we describe these constituents of C0 in terms of C.E a c h
atom I(J,K,...) in the common reﬁnement IN of I1,I2,...,In is consid-
ered as one point of Ω0 and we denote this point by i (j,k,...). Hence,
Ω0 = {i | I ∈ IN} is a ﬁnite set. The probability measure µ on Ω induces
canonically the measure µ0 on Ω0, where each subset B of Ω0 is measurable
and the measure µ(B) is given by
Pm
k=1 µ(Ik),i fB consists of the points
i1,i 2,...,i k corresponding to the atoms I1,I 2,...,I k in IN.
Note that for each of the partitions I1,I2,...,In (and also for IS = ∧i∈SIi
for each S ∈ 2N \{ ∅})t h ea t o m sa r eﬁnite unions of elements in IN.S ot h e
atoms in Ii (i ∈ N) correspond to disjoint subsets of Ω0,w h i c hf o r ma
partition of Ω0,t h a tw ed e n o t eb yI0
i.








where I is the atom in IN corresponding to i.
S o ,w eh a v ed e ﬁned the canonical discretization C0 of C.N o t et h a tt h e r ei s
also a one to one relation between the atoms of IS and I0
S = ∧i∈SI0
i. We will
denote in the following the atom in I0
S which corresponds to the atom J in IS
by J. The question arises: What is the relation between the corresponding
IC-games v0 and v? The answer is simple.
Theorem 3 The IC-games v0 and v corresponding to C0 and C coincide.
Proof. Take S ∈ 2N \{ ∅}. We have to show that v0(S)=v(S).U s i n g




















































Example 3 Take the information collecting situation of Example 1. Then



























0 × A → <
E
of C we have













0 |a − x|dx for each a ∈ A,
etc
In the next section we go one step further and we will describe a method
to ﬁn df o ra nI C - s i t u a t i o nw i t haﬁnite state space a related appropriate
IC-situation with the same state space and also with a ﬁnite action space.
125 A reduction procedure for the action space
Let C =
D
N,n,(Ω,µ),{Ii}i∈N ,A,r: Ω × A → <
E
be an IC-situation with Ω




N,n,(Ω,µ),{Ii}i∈N ,A(ε),r: Ω × A(ε) → <
E
,
where A(ε) is a ﬁnite subset of A, such that the distance of the two corre-
sponding games v and vε does not exceed ε.S i n c eΩ is ﬁnite, also the family
2Ω of non-empty subsets of Ω is ﬁnite. For each J ∈ 2Ω we take an action







r(ω,a)dµ(ω) − εµ(J). (3)
Deﬁne A(ε)=
n
a(ε,J) | J ∈ 2Ω
o
.T h e n A(ε) ⊂ A and for the corre-
sponding Cε and its IC-game vε we have
Theorem 4 d(v,vε) ≤ ε.
























J r(ω,a)dµ(ω)=ε + vε(S).
Hence, d(v,vε)=m a x S∈2N\{∅} |vε(S) − v(S)| ≤ ε.
Example 4 Take the information collecting situation C0 from Example 3.
Then Ω0 = {p,q,r} and optimal actions corresponding to the subsets {p},{q},








tively. So the information collecting situation C00,o b t a i n e df r o mC0 by replac-









is an information collecting situation
for which the corresponding game v00 coincides with v0.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Combining the procedures in Sections 4 and 5 we can ﬁnd for each IC-
situation C with inﬁnite state and action spaces a related ﬁnite approxi-
mation C00 such that the two involved IC-games are as near to each other as
one wants. The continuity properties of the diﬀerent compensation schemes
guarantee then that the corresponding compensations in the two games are
also near to each other. A similar discretization procedure can be developed
for information sharing games, introduced in Slikker et al. (2000). In this
context it is interesting to note that the multifunction PMAS, which assigns
to a game the set of its population monotonic allocation schemes (cf. Spru-
mont, 1990) is upper and lower continuous by the same argument used for
the multifunction BIMAS.
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